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I.  INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a global, interconnected network of computers that 
allows data transfers and provides a variety of interactive, real-time 
and time-delayed telecommunications services.  Internet 
communications are based on common, public protocols.  Hundreds 
of millions of computers are connected to the Internet at any moment.  
The vast majority of computers connect to the Internet through 
commercial Internet Service Providers (“ISP”s).1  Users connect to the 
Internet through ISP dial-ups, cable modems connections, residential 
Digital Subscriber Lines (“DSL”), or through corporate networks 
(Local Area Networks (“LAN”s)).  Ninety-eight percent of domestic 
residential broadband customers access the Internet through DSL or a 
cable modem.2  Only about half of residential consumers have a choice 
between even two providers.  Typically, the routers and switches 
owned by the ISP send the caller’s packets to a local Point of Presence 
(“POP”) on the Internet.  In dial-up, cable modem, and DSL, the 
access POPs, as well as corporate networks dedicated access circuits, 
connect to high-speed hubs.  Generally, access POPs (which serve 
dial-up, cable modem and DSL connections) and corporate networks 
with dedicated access circuits connect to high-speed hubs.  High-
speed circuits, leased from or owned by telephone companies, connect 
the high-speed hubs, forming an Internet Backbone Network (“IBN”).  
The Internet is the primary global network for digital 
communications.  A number of different services are provided on the 
Internet, including, among numerous others, e-mail servers, browser
interfaces (using Internet Explorer, Firefox, Opera, or others), Peer-
to-Peer file exchange services, and Internet telephony (Voice over 
Internet Protocol (“VOIP”)).  A number of software applications run 
on top of the Internet browser, including information services 
(Google, Yahoo, MSN), image displays, video transmissions and 
others.  Since the advent of Mosaic, the first Internet browser, in 1993, 
the Internet has evolved beyond text-based interface to support 
images, sound, and video transmitted in digital format.  Even full-
length movies are regularly downloaded, rented, or sold through 
1 Educational institutions and government departments are also connected to the Internet 
but do not offer commercial ISP services.
2 See Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearing on “Network 
Neutrality” (testimony of Vinton G. Cerf ), 109th Cong., 1st sess., 2006, 
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/cerf-020706.pdf (accessed April 10, 2008).
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commercial services over the Internet and viewed on personal 
computers or television sets.
As video services and the digital distribution of content over the 
Internet grow, Internet broadband access providers including AT&T, 
Verizon, and a number of cable TV companies, have recently 
demanded additional compensation for carrying digital services.  Ed 
Whitacre, the Chief Executive Officer of AT&T, expressed his 
company’s dislike of existing regulatory structures: “Now what they 
would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them do 
that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return 
on it.”3
The claim that consumers, content providers, or applications 
providers use the Internet for free is certainly incorrect.4  Currently, 
users pay ISPs for access to the Internet.  Similarly, ISPs pay fees to 
Internet backbones for access to the Internet.5  ISPs pay per month for 
3 “Online Extra: At SBC, It’s All About ‘Scale and Scope,’” BusinessWeek, November 7, 
2005, http://www.businessweek.com/@@n34h*IUQu7KtOwgA/
magazine/content/05_45/b3958092.htm (accessed April 10, 2008).  
Interview of Ed Whitacre:
Q.  How concerned are you about Internet upstarts like Google (GOOG), 
MSN, Vonage, and others?
A.  How do you think they’re going to get to customers? Through a 
broadband pipe. Cable companies have them. We have them. Now what 
they would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them 
do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return 
on it. So there’s going to have to be some mechanism for these people 
who use these pipes to pay for the portion they’re using. Why should 
they be allowed to use my pipes? 
The Internet can’t be free in that sense, because we and the cable 
companies have made an investment and for a Google or Yahoo! 
(YHOO) or Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes [for] free is 
nuts!
4 Of course, the categories of consumers, content providers and applications providers 
intersect since a consumer could also be providing content to some extent.  In making the 
distinction between these three categories of Internet participants I define them by their 
primary function.
5 This service is called “transit.”  See Nicholas Economides, “The Economics of the Internet 
Backbone,” in Handbook of Telecommunications, ed. S. Majumder, et al., 379–381 (New 
York, NY: Elsevier B.V. 2005), http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_
ECONOMICS_OF_THE_INTERNET_BACKBONE.pdf (accessed April 10, 2008);
Nicholas Economides, “The Economics of the Internet,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Economics (forthcoming), http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_
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a virtual “pipe” of a certain bandwidth, according to their expected 
use.6  When digital content (or information packets of any service) is 
downloaded by consumer A from provider B, both A and B pay.  A
pays his ISP through his monthly subscription, and B pays similarly.  
In turn, ISPs pay their respective backbones through their monthly 
subscriptions.  Unlike a traditional telephone call arrangement in 
which only the calling party pays, Internet backbones collect from 
both sides of a communication.
So, what change would AT&T’s CEO like to see in the pricing and 
industry structure?  He desires the abolition of “net neutrality,” the 
regime that does not distinguish in terms of price between bits or 
information packets according to the services that they provide, and 
additionally fails to distinguish in price based on the identities of the 
uploader and downloader. This pricing regime has prevailed since the 
inception of the commercial Internet.7  Presently, an information 
packet used for VOIPs, email, images, or video is priced equally as a 
part of the large number of packets that correspond to the 
subscription services of the originating and terminating ISPs.
In addition to content neutrality, there is no distinction made 
according to the identities of the uploader and downloader.  AT&T,
Verizon, and cable Internet access providers would like to abolish the 
regime of “net neutrality” and in its place substitute a pricing schedule 
that charges both the final customer for his or her basic transmission 
service and the transmission’s originating party (such as Google, etc.) 
for the provision of content.  An access network, for example AT&T, 
wants to charge fees to an originating party even when the originating 
party does not connect to the Internet using AT&T and therefore does 
not have any contractual relationship with AT&T.  Access network 
operators have also reserved the right to charge differently based on 
the identity of the provider even for the same type of packets; for 
example, an ISP may charge Google more than Yahoo for the same 
transmission.  The proposed Internet model, without “net neutrality,” 
would more closely mirror the traditional pre-Internet 
                                                                                                                  
Economics_of_the_Internet_for_Palgrave.pdf (accessed April 8, 2008).  In addition to 
transit service, Internet backbones of comparable size “peer” with each other, which means 
that they agree not to exchange money for exchanged traffic.
6 See Economides, The Economics of the Internet Backbone, Table 5.
7 We disregard pricing issues in the pre-commercial Internet when it was first primarily a 
network among military contractors and later a network among primarily academic 
communities.
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telecommunications model in which customers pay per service.8  This 
would be a very sharp departure from the way the Internet was 
designed to operate and how it has run since its inception (that is, 
pricing without reference to particular services or functions of the 
transmitted information packets).
After the acquisition of AT&T by Southwestern Bell (“SBC”)9 and 
of Microwave Communications Inc. (MCI) by Verizon, enabled by a 
change in regulatory rules by the Federal Communications 
Commission, the resulting consolidated companies (AT&T and 
Verizon) now advocate price discrimination according to the type of 
application and the provider used to transmit the content.10  AT&T,
Verizon, and cable TV companies would like to abolish the regime of 
“net neutrality” and substitute a complex pricing schedule where, 
besides the basic charge for transmission of bits, there will also be 
additional charges by the Internet access operator applied to the 
originating party (such as Google, Yahoo, or MSN).  These charges 
would apply even when the application provider is not directly 
connected to AT&T or Verizon, that is, even when Google’s ISP is not 
AT&T or Verizon.11  
The broadband Internet access providers’ new pricing scheme will 
most likely impose price discrimination on the provider side of the 
market and not on the subscriber.  That is, the change will implement 
two-sided pricing.  This is uniquely possible for firms operating within 
a network structure.  Outside of traditional networks, such two-sided 
pricing is also made possible by the intermediaries operating between 
trading parties in exchange networks (such as the exchanges 
themselves).12  There is presently considerable debate over the 
8 See Nicholas Economides, Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction, in The 
Limits and Complexity of Organizations, ed. Richard R. Nelson, 48–76 (New York, NY: 
Russell Sage Foundation Press, 2005), http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/
Economides_Telecommunications_Regulation.pdf (accessed April 10, 2008).  A 
discussion of the differences between the Internet and earlier digital data networks, and an 
exposition of traditional telecommunications regulation.
9 SBC changed its name to AT&T after it acquired AT&T.
10 Recently, Deutsche Telecom and Telecom Italia have made similar proposals.
11 See Economides, “Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction.”  The proposed 
Internet model without “net neutrality” would be closer to the traditional pre-Internet 
telecommunications model where customers pay per service.
12 See Nicholas Economides, “Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction,” 
in The New Economy and Beyond: Past, Present and Future, ed. Dennis Jansen, 112–13 
(London: Edward Elgar, 2006), http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_
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legality, as well as the efficiency, of the implementation of the 
proposed changes.  There is additional concern due to the 
considerable market power of such firms.  
II.  ABOLITION OF NON-DISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENTS
Electronic networks are created by a number of different, 
complementary levels of necessary operation.  The Internet is 
supported by low-level sets of protocols, primarily Transmission 
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (“TCP/IP”).  These protocols 
define three basic levels of functions in the network: (1) the 
hardware/electronics level of the physical network, (2) the (logical) 
network level where basic communication and interoperability is 
established, and (3) the applications/services level.13  The Internet 
separates the network interoperability level from the 
applications/services level.  This means that, unlike earlier centralized 
digital electronic communications networks, such as CompuServe, 
AT&T Mail, Prodigy, and early AOL, the Internet allows a large variety 
of applications and services to be run “at the edge” of the network and 
not centrally.  This means that users have a tremendous amount of 
choice: if a user elects to download video, he can do so without asking 
permission from a central authority in the network.  For example, if a 
user elects to run a spyware-stopper, he may do so according to his 
preference; the network does not select security software for him.
The tremendous degree of choice of applications and content on 
the Internet is a direct consequence of its design, in which 
intelligence, applications, services, and content live “at the edge” of 
the network and are only dependent on the network for connectivity.  
A key consequence of “net neutrality” pricing has been successful 
innovation resulting, for example, in Google, Yahoo, and MSN as well 
as the large number of applications developed by companies that do 
not own any network infrastructure.  Many companies have been able 
to innovate at the edge of the network.  These innovations include new 
                                                                                                                  
Competition_Policy.pdf (accessed April 10, 2008), for a discussion of two-sided pricing in 
a network.
13 See Richard S. Whitt, “A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New Communications 
Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model,” Federal Communications 
Law Journal 56 (May 2004): 587672; Senate Committee, Hearing on “Network 
Neutrality.”
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methods of content distribution (both news and entertainment),14 the 
distribution and modification of applications (including patching and 
updates), and the creation of many new applications such as 
interactive advertising.
Since the beginning of the commercial Internet, Internet pricing 
did not discriminate with respect to the identity of those receiving 
information packets, those sending them, or the nature of the 
information packets and the function they served.  The content of the 
packets and the frequency of interactions are all irrelevant.  Networks 
simply set different prices according to the bandwidth required for 
transfers.  Transmitters and receivers of Internet information packets 
are charged according to the amount of bandwidth they subscribe to.  
For example, a residential DSL customer may buy from his ISP a 
384Kb per second bandwidth pipe, while a business customer can buy 
a multiple of the same.  Similarly, ISPs are charged—by Internet 
backbones—subscription fees according to the bandwidth they 
require/use.  
Typically, Internet transmissions are carried over infrastructure 
owned by telecommunications companies, cable TV companies, and 
terrestrial satellites.  Following the regulatory tradition of the United 
States, until the summer of 2005, telecommunication-facility-based 
Internet transmissions were subject to common carrier regulation that 
included non-discrimination requirements.  Other Internet 
transmissions, those not telecommunication-facility-based, were not 
subject to common carrier regulation.  Thus, DSL service was 
considered a common carrier service, and therefore subject to non-
discrimination provisions.  Cable modem service, in contrast, was not 
considered common carrier service, and therefore did not have to 
abide by such provisions.
In the summer of 2005, the Federal Communications Commission 
changed the classification of Internet transmissions from 
“telecommunications services” to “information services.”15  This 
implied that there were no longer “non-discrimination” restrictions on 
Internet service pricing.  The remarks of the president of SBC (now 
AT&T after SBC acquired AT&T in 2005–2006), and similar 
14 There are significant changes in many industries because of the Internet.  For example, 
dissemination of news through the Internet has cut radically into the circulation of 
newspapers and has resulted in a round of consolidations among newspapers.
15 In mid-2005 the FCC reclassified Internet service to no longer be subject to non-
discrimination rules.  See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs, 125 S. 
Ct. 2688 (2005).
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expressions by Verizon and cable TV companies, underscore the 
concerns of network infrastructure operators who are keen to extract 
more of the value generated by the information packets they 
transport.  This value accrues to both final consumers as consumers’ 
surplus16 and to application or content providers as profits.  
It is widely believed that an additional reason for the proposed 
change is the increasing introduction of video services by AT&T and 
Verizon.  It is expected that video services will congest “last mile” 
broadband Internet access as it is presently sold.  Therefore, AT&T 
and Verizon would like to set up pricing differentiation so that 
consumers will buy the content generated by their service provider 
rather than the content offered by the service provider’s competitors.  
However, broadband access providers have not committed to any 
restriction on their ability to extract additional surplus from their 
consumers and content or application providers.  In addition, 
broadband access providers have not committed to restrictions on the 
use of price discrimination instruments.  Industry lobbyists have 
proposed congressional bills that legalize the ability of an access 
provider to impose any price discrimination scheme it chooses.  
Presently, residential consumers pay at most $24 billion a year for
broadband Internet access, as shown in Section IV.  The combination 
of the consumers’ surplus and the profits generated by Internet-
distributed complementary applications and Internet-distributed 
content are a very large multiple of the current cost of residential 
broadband service.  Thus, changes in fee structure proposed by access 
providers have the potential to seriously disrupt the current 
distribution of wealth between content, applications, and 
transmission service providers.
To put the proposed change in perspective, it is useful to 
understand what unrestricted discriminatory pricing would mean in 
the context of a traditional telecommunications network.  If a 
telephone company were free from legal restrictions on price 
discrimination the company could, for example, routinely charge more 
for phone calls between investment bankers.  This additional charge 
may be “justified” by the company because such phone calls are more 
likely to generate value than the average phone call.  If phone 
companies were unregulated with respect to price discrimination, they 
could charge more for fax telephone calls than for other calls, since fax 
transmissions are likely to be more valuable on average than phone 
calls.  Similarly, a telephone company without a non-discrimination 
16 Consumers’ surplus is the difference between what consumers are willing to pay and 
what they actually pay.
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requirement could charge a high price for 911 emergency calls because 
the willingness to pay for these calls is obviously high.
As discussed above, the Internet under the “net neutrality” model 
separated the network layer from the applications/services layer.  This 
allowed firms to innovate “at the edge of the network” without seeking 
approval from network operators.17  The decentralization of the 
Internet based on “net neutrality” facilitated innovation resulting in 
successes such as the creation of the World Wide Web, Google, MSN, 
Skype, Yahoo, etc.  “Net neutrality” also increased competition among 
the applications and services that operate “at the edge of the network,” 
which did not need to own a network in order to compete.  The 
existence of network effects (the increase in value that each user 
experiences as more users are added to the network) on the Internet 
implies that efficient prices to users on both sides (consumers and 
applications) are lower than they would be in a market without 
network effects.18  A departure from “net neutrality” is likely to 
increase prices, which will reduce network effects and hamper 
innovation.
III.  DETAILED EXAMINATION OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONCERNS 
ARISING FROM THE ABOLITION OF “NET NEUTRALITY”
A.  HORIZONTAL CONCERNS
The abolition of “net neutrality” raises both horizontal and vertical 
antitrust and public interest issues.  In addition to the pricing issues, 
there are concerns that network operators will discriminate against 
certain types of content and political opinions.19
17 Vint Cerf, one of the “fathers of the Internet,” has called this environment “innovation 
without permission” of the network.  Senate Committee, Hearing on “Network 
Neutrality,” (testimony of Vinton G. Cerf).
18 See Nicholas Economides, “The Economics of Networks,” International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 14 (1996): 675–99, http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/
Economides_Economics_of_Networks.pdf (accessed April 10, 2008).
19 See, for example, House Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on “Network Neutrality: 
Competition, Innovation, and Nondiscriminatory Access,” 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 2006 
(testimony of Tim Wu), at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/wu042506.pdf 
(accessed April 10, 2008).  Wu discusses how Western Union, in the 1860s, when it had a 
telegraph monopoly, wrote an exclusive contract with the Associated Press that 
discriminated in price against other news organizations, and that resulted in a near 
monopoly for the Associated Press.
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This section starts with a discussion of the horizontal antitrust 
concerns.  Carriers in the “last mile” to the home have significant 
market power.  Residential retail customers may have difficulty 
changing ISPs in response to price or quality changes.  For 98% of 
residential consumers in the United States, there are only one or two 
choices for broadband Internet access: either DSL or cable modem 
access.20  
Cable TV broadband Internet service is available to 92% of U.S. 
households but market penetration is significantly lower.21  Most 
cable TV companies offer broadband Internet access only in 
conjunction with a digital cable TV package.22  Due to technical 
limitations, DSL is offered only to households that are close to a local 
telephone company switch; the capabilities of the connection diminish 
as the distance from the switch increases.  The vast majority of U.S. 
households cannot buy DSL service (so-called “naked DSL”) without 
at the same time subscribing to voice telephone service on the same 
line.23  Even where naked DSL is available, its price often significantly 
exceeds the price of DSL service that includes voice provision on the 
same line.  
Due to coverage and bundling issues, and the very limited number 
of residential broadband providers, existing providers, typically AT&T, 
Verizon, or a cable TV company, have significant market power.  The 
complications of changing equipment, configuration, email addresses, 
etc., imply significant switching costs for customers.  Such costs add to 
the market power of existing local access providers.  Finally, 
residential customers are affected by bundling of broadband Internet 
access with other services, such as telecommunications and cable 
television.  However, despite the significant market power and high 
concentration in the Internet broadband access market, carriers are 
unable to effectively discriminate in price between monopoly and 
20 Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearing on “Network 
Neutrality,” (testimony of Vinton G. Cerf).
21 See National Cable and Telecommunications Association, 
http://www.ncta.com/Statistic/Statistic/ResidentialCableHighSpeedDataSubscribers.aspx 
(accessed April 10, 2008). 
22 Even when broadband Internet access is offered by itself, it is typically offered at the full 
price of the bundle of Internet access and digital cable TV combined.
23 There is no technical requirement for this, and the EU has mandated unbundling of the 
fixed local telecommunications network that allows DSL to be provided separately from 
voice service, as well as in its absence.
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duopoly customers.  Marketing through mass channels constrains 
carriers by forcing them to set prices for large regions, typically 
covering multiple states.  Some carriers have nationwide pricing.  
Thus, access carriers with significant market power are unable to 
extract value from consumers to an extent proportional with their 
market power.
Carriers have much less market power upstream on the Internet 
backbone because, despite some concentration, there is a much more 
egalitarian distribution of market share on the backbone than in the 
residential access market.  Market share of national backbones are 
listed in Table 1 based on 1999 data and projections.  In papers filed in 
support of the merger of SBC and AT&T, as well as the merger of 
Verizon with MCI, there was mention of two recent traffic studies by 
Ryan Hankin Kent Research (“RHK”).  These studies, showing traffic 
for 2004, are summarized in Table 2.  The data demonstrate a 
dramatic change in the ranking of the networks, with AT&T ranked 
first and MCI fourth in 2004.  They also show that a much larger 
share of traffic (over 40%) is now carried by smaller networks.  These 
latest traffic studies show that earlier concerns, expressed in the 
European Union (“EU”) and by the United States Department of 
Justice, that the Internet backbone market would tilt to create 
monopoly situations, have proven overstated.24
Table 1. Market Shares of National Internet Backbones25
Company 1997 1999 2001 
(projected in 
1999)
2003 
(projected in 
1999)
MCI WorldCom 43% 38% 35% 32%
GTE-BBN 13% 15% 16% 17%
AT&T 12% 11% 14% 19%
Sprint 12% 9% 8% 7%
Cable 
&Wireless 
9% 6% 6% 6%
All Other 11% 21% 22% 19%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
24 See Economides, Competition Policy in Network Industries for a more detailed 
discussion of the EU and DOJ concerns regarding the WorldCom-MCI and MCI-Sprint 
mergers.
25 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on the MCI WorldCom-Sprint Merger, 
106th Cong., 1st sess., 1999 27–38 (testimony of Tod A. Jacobs, Senior 
Telecommunications Analyst, Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., Inc.); Bernstein Research, MCI 
WorldCom (Bernstein Report, March 1999), 51.
220 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 4:2
Table 2. Carrier Traffic in Petabytes per Month in 200426
Company Traffic Market 
share 
among all 
networks
1Q2004 2Q2004 3Q2004 4Q2004 4Q2004
A (AT&T) 37.19 38.66 44.54 52.33 12.58%
B 36.48 36.50 41.41 51.31 12.33%
C 34.11 35.60 36.75 45.89 11.03%
D (MCI) 24.71 25.81 26.86 30.87 7.42%
E 18.04 18.89 21.08 25.46 6.12%
F 16.33 17.78 17.47 19.33 4.65%
G 16.67 15.04 14.93 15.19 3.65%
Total 
traffic 
Top 7 
networks
183.53 188.28 203.04 240.38 57.78%
Total 
traffic all 
networks
313 313 353 416 100%
As shown in the above tables, concentration in the Internet 
backbone market is lower than in the broadband access market and 
has decreased in the last five years.  Additionally, both firms and ISPs 
can connect with multiple suppliers.  This practice, “multi-homing,” is 
engaged in by many ISPs as well as many of their business customers 
for two reasons: first, ISPs and large business customers multi-home 
on various backbones to avoid outages; second, both ISPs and 
customers multi-home to place additional competitive pressure on 
their service providers.  In contrast to the residential customer, who 
must often select among a small group of broadband access providers, 
business customers, especially large business customers, have many 
choices.  The fact that the Internet access market is more competitive 
for large business customers is reflected in the significantly lower 
price per unit of bandwidth that large business customers pay, both in 
comparison to the prices residential customers pay and to the prices 
small business customers pay.
I first consider two-sided pricing by a monopolist who charges 
both final consumers and applications or content providers.  I then 
26 Data from RHK Traffic Analysis–Methodology and Results, May 2005, as reported in 
Declaration of Marius Schwartz to the FCC in the SBC-AT&T merger.  The identities of all 
networks are not provided, but it is likely that B, C, E and F are Level 3, Quest, Sprint, and 
SBC in unknown order.
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discuss general price discrimination strategies by a monopolist.  I
follow up with the price discrimination issues in an oligopoly 
situation.
1. TWO-SIDED PRICING MODEL
I model the two-sided network as follows.  Consider the strategic 
interactions between a network access monopolist A0, an applications 
or content company B1 (selling a complementary good to network 
access) and the final consumers of content when the network can 
charge a fee to both consumers and applications providers.27  In the 
mathematical part of the text, for brevity I will be using the word 
“application” to mean both applications and content.  The network 
access firm sells an Internet connection subscription to end users at 
price p0.  The application provider sells the application to end users at 
price p1.  The application provider also pays the network a per unit 
access fee s, which the network has set.
Assuming a linear demand structure, let the demand function of 
network access service be q0 = a0 – b0p0 – dp1, and the demand of the 
application B1 be q1 = a1 – b1p1 – dp0.28  In this model, the quantity 
intercept a0 of the network access demand (representing actual sales 
when all prices are zero) depends on the inherent quality and function 
of the network and the variety (number) of applications that are 
transported on the network.29  In the demand function, the parameter 
d measures the strength of the complementarity between the network 
and the application.30,31  The profit function of the access network is 
27 The mathematical structure of this model is similar to Nicholas Economides and 
Evangelos Katsamakas, Two-sided Competition of Proprietary vs. Open Source 
Technology Platforms and the Implications for the Software Industry, 52 MGMT. SCI.
1057, 1071 (2006), http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_Katsamakas_Two-
sided.pdf.
28 Ibid.  This demand system can be generated by a population of users with differing 
willingness to pay.  For example, it can be generated by a population of users of uniformly 
distributed types, each with a unit demand.  This demand system can also be generated by 
a representative consumer with quadratic utility function. 
29 Ibid.  The maximum sales of the network, a0, may be larger than the maximum sales of 
the application, a1, i.e., a1   a0.
30 The degree of complementarity between two goods measures the extent to which two 
goods are used together.
31 I assume b0, b1 > d, i.e., that the own-price effect for each product dominates the cross-
price effect.  To create a benchmark, I assume zero cost.
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au 000   , where 000 qpu   is the network profit from users, and 
10 sqa   is the network profit from the application access fees.  The 
profit function of the application provider is   111 qsp  .
I assume that network access firms and applications firms set 
prices in a two-stage game.  In stage one, the access network sets the 
access fee s paid by the application provider.  In stage two, the 
network access and the application provider set the price the end-user 
pays, p0, p1 simultaneously.  We assume a non-cooperative game and 
we find and characterize the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
To find the non-cooperative equilibrium, we start the analysis at 
the last stage of the game.  Imposing maximization conditions with 
respect to the choices of prices p0 and p1 by the network and the 
application, we find the network and application prices as respectively 
increasing and decreasing functions of the network access fee s.32  In 
the first stage of the game, the network chooses fee s anticipating 
second stage equilibrium prices.  The necessary condition for profit 
maximization is     0100 1000  qsqp dsdqdsdpdsdqdsd .  A marginal 
increase of s  affects both profit streams of the network firm.  The 
network’s profit from users increases by ds
dqp 00  and decreases by 
|| 00 ds
dpq .  The profit from the application firm increases by 1q  and 
decreases by || 1ds
dqs .33  The network’s choice of s  maximizes the sum 
of the two profit streams.  The effect of s  on the network profit from 
users is          2210
2
1010
2
101
2
1010
4
2262
dbb
dbbbasdbbbdbbad
ds
sd du

 .  The profit from 
users is decreasing at 0s , since        02210
2
1010
2
1010
4
2220 


dbb
dbbbadbbda
ds
d du .  
32 Specifically, equilibrium prices are 2
10
1110
4
32
0 dbb
sdbdabap 
 and  2
10
2
10001
4
22
1 dbb
sdbbdabap 
 .  
Notice that 01 ds
dp
and 00 ds
dp
, that is, as expected, the application price increases with 
the access fee s  because the application firm faces a higher marginal cost, while the 
network price decreases as the application has a higher price.  These two effects imply that 
sales of the access network (respectively application) increase (decrease) in the access fee s: 
0100 0  ds
dp
ds
dp
ds
dq db and 0011 1  ds
dp
ds
dp
ds
dq db .
33 Both profit streams of the network are concave in s and, therefore, the total network 
profit is concave is s.
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Therefore, the fee us  that would maximize only the access network 
profit from users is negative.
The effect of fee s on the access network profit from the application is 
   
2
10
2
100010
4
42
1 dbb
sdbbdaba
ds
sd ba 
 .  This profit is increasing at 0s , if 
02 001  daba .  Then 

as   is positive, and therefore 
s  may be positive 
or negative    au sss .  The access fee s  is positive when, at s = 0,
the access profit from the application is increasing at a faster rate than 
the profit from users is decreasing.   Figure 1 shows an example of that 
case.  Figure 2 shows the relationship between the network’s fee to the 
application, the network profit, the application’s profit and the total 
industry surplus, which is the sum of the profits of the network, the 
profits of the application, and consumers’ surplus.
The two-stage game has a unique sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium given by the following prices:
Figure 1.  Network Profit Streams and Access Fee, s*
Figure 2.  Network Profits, Application Profits, and Total Industry Surplus
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Thus, as Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate, total industry surplus is 
lower when the access network charges a positive fee to applications, 
even though a positive fee will typically be part of the equilibrium.  
Intuitively, this can be explained as follows:  the fee acts as a marginal 
tax on the application and therefore increases its marginal cost and 
the price that the application charges to final consumers.  Due to the 
complementarity between the application and the network, increasing 
the price of the application also hurts network sales.  Thus, imposing a 
fee on the application would have a larger negative impact on total 
industry surplus than imposing the same fee on the consumers and no 
fee on the application.  The same argument can be made in terms of 
network effects.  There are network effects between the application 
and the network.   Therefore, if the network imposes a fee on the 
application it will result in some negative effect on the network 
provider.  For this reason, imposing a fee on applications reduces total 
industry surplus.34
2.  PRICE DISCRIMINATING MONOPOLIST
The Internet, as it exists today, supports large numbers of 
applications and services.  There is wide range in the willingnesses to 
pay for each type of service, and there is wide dispersion in its 
distribution.  There is no simple index or measure of capacity or 
bandwidth use of an application that is closely correlated to the 
willingness to pay for that application.  For example, bandwidth use is 
high for some highly valued services, such as video on demand, but 
bandwidth use is very low for information services, such as search or 
bidding in auctions in real time, which are also highly valuable.  
In the absence of legally required non-discrimination, Internet 
broadband access providers may attempt to capture the consumer 
surplus that remains after uniform pricing.  There are two reasons for 
this attempt.  First, even in an unconstrained monopoly situation, 
price discrimination, based on differences in the elasticity of demand, 
increases profits.  Second, uniform regional pricing, discussed above, 
constrains carriers’ profits to duopoly levels, below the level that could 
be achieved through price discrimination.  When selling to residential 
customers, a last mile monopolist carrier typically has the incentive to 
reduce the capacity of “plain” broadband Internet access service so 
34 Although the duopoly competition model for access with monopoly or duopoly 
applications had not yet been developed, there is no reason to believe that the main result 
on reduction of surplus by the imposition of fees on applications is going to be different.
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that it can establish a “premium” service at a higher price as discussed 
below. 
Suppose that information packets differ according to the 
willingness of end-users to pay for them.  Let packet of type/function i
be offered at price pi and its demand be Di(pi), i = 1, . . , n, under a 
price discrimination model.  Alternatively, all packets could be sold at 
the same price p.  Assuming that the cost of transmission is the same 
for all packets, in a price discriminating network the monopolist faces 
a cost, C(Σi Di(pi)), and its profits under discrimination (Πd) are Πd = 
Σi piDi(pi) – C(Σi Di(pi)).  It is easy to show that maximization of the 
monopolist’s profits implies [pi – C’(Σi Di(pi))]/pi = 1/εi , where εi is 
the elasticity of demand for packets of type i.  Alternatively when all 
packets are sold at the same price, the monopolist maximizes profits 
under uniform pricing Πu (“u” for uniform pricing) Πu = p[Σi Di(p)] -
C(Σi Di(p)).  Maximization of uniform pricing profits implies [p – C’(Σi
Di(p))]/p = [Σi Di(p)]/[Σi Di(p)εi], that is, in uniform pricing, the 
percentage of price to cost margin is a weighted average of the 
elasticities of demand for the various types of packages. 
In general, the coordinated introduction of price discrimination 
schemes may reduce output.  There is a general theorem in economics 
that price discrimination, which reduces total output, also reduces 
total surplus.35  Thus, the first anti-competitive concern is that price 
discrimination may reduce output.
Two additional considerations reinforce this anti-competitive 
concern.  First, most applications on the Internet exhibit network 
effects as described above.  This means that the last 
transaction/sale/download is worth more to the consumer when sales 
of compatible applications are higher.  For example, the Google search 
application is more valuable when Google has a larger audience.  
Using YouTube is more valuable when there are more subscribers to 
that web place.  Additionally, more individual users decide to 
subscribe and to post on a web space when the web space has more 
subscribers.  The existence of network effects implies that the efficient 
prices (total surplus maximizing prices) are below the perfectly 
competitive prices, that is, below marginal cost.36  Broadband access 
35 This is contingent on serving all markets under uniform pricing, which holds here since I 
am starting with all markets served under “net neutrality.”  See Marius Schwartz, “Third-
Degree Price Discrimination and Output: Generalizing a Welfare Result,” American 
Economic Review 80 (1990): 1259–62.
36 See Nicholas Economides, “The Economics of Networks,” International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 14 (1996); 675–99,  http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/
Economides_Economics_of_Networks.pdf.
226 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 4:2
providers are charging, at best, duopoly prices, which are typically 
considerably higher than perfectly competitive prices.  Thus, 
increasing present market prices as an effect of price discrimination 
will increase price divergence from efficient prices.
Second, the fact that application and content providers will be 
charged instead of subscribers is likely to mask the true cost of 
Internet service to residential subscribers and create additional price 
distortion and surplus loss.37
3.  OLIGOPOLY CONCERNS
There is an additional concern in duopoly.   Because broadband 
access competition is duopolistic in many areas, the creation of a 
“premium” service and the accompanying reduction in bandwidth 
capacity of plain service required to create it is likely to be coordinated 
among network access providers.  The coordinated reduction of 
capacity in “plain” service is reminiscent of cartel behavior, such as 
two competing airlines deciding in a coordinated way to reduce their 
capacity in economy class.   Therefore, the introduction of coordinated 
price discrimination may have anti-competitive consequences.  In 
particular, if there is sufficient evidence that the markets for “plain” 
and “premium” services are sufficiently different, the cartelization of 
“plain” service is likely to be a Sherman Act Section 1 violation. 
B.  VERTICAL CONCERNS
There is also a variety of potentially anti-competitive vertical 
activity that could result in Sherman Act Section 2 violations as 
discussed below.  
First, a carrier may favor its own content or application over that 
of independent providers.  VOIP provided over broadband Internet by 
companies without a network infrastructure, such as Vonage or 
EarthLink, competes with traditional circuit-switched service 
provided by AT&T and Verizon and with VOIP provided by cable TV 
operators.  Independent VOIP could be subject to discrimination.  
Additionally, both AT&T and Verizon are gearing to distribute video,38
37 The generally more competitive market for large business customers will not shield them 
from the levies imposed by the access carriers.
38 See Fred Dawson, “More Details on Verizon’s Initial Video Launch,” xchange.com, 
http://www.xchangemag.com/hotnews/59h231024228723.html (accessed April 10, 
2008).
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and could favor their video services over that of others.  In the absence 
of non-discrimination rules, last mile carriers can leverage their 
market power in the Internet broadband access market to 
control/support their voice telecommunications market.  This concern 
applies both to telecommunications companies who can degrade 
opponents VOIP service to protect their fixed line voice service and to 
cable companies who may degrade their opponents’ VOIP service to 
protect their own VOIP service.  
Similar concerns operate with regard to carriers’ video services.  It 
should be clear that, although active sabotage of a competitor’s service 
is an obvious, and illegal, form of discrimination, network access 
providers do not need to use these tactics.  To discriminate effectively 
against a VOIP competitor, it will be sufficient for the access provider 
to set a high fee for access to the “premium lane,” which will 
effectively block profitable operation by the competitor whose 
operation in the “standard lane” has been degraded by the high 
allocation of bandwidth to the fast lane.39  
Second, the anti-competitive concerns are hardly limited to the 
products and services currently provided by the firms with market 
power in the access market.  Such carriers can also leverage market 
power in broadband access to the content or applications markets 
through contractual relationships.  Two examples of this use of market 
power follow:
First, a carrier can contract with an Internet search engine (or 
other application, or video content provider) to put it in “premium” 
service, while searches using other search engines have considerable 
delays using “plain” service.  In this setup, the “plain” service can be 
tweaked to be sufficiently slow so that consumers will choose to do 
almost all their searches with the search engine in “premium” service.  
By making a “take it or leave it” offer to the various search engines, the 
access carrier can extract a large part of the profits created by 
complementary goods, in this example, search engines.  In effect, this 
type of strategy can determine who will be the successful search (or 
application, or content) company.  It would give tremendous power to 
the network company without any obtrusiveness or the active 
sabotage of any individual company.
Second, in the same setup, a carrier can actively sabotage a search 
engine (or application, or content) company with similar results as 
above.
39 See Nicholas Economides, “The Incentive for Non-Price Discrimination by an Input 
Monopolist,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 16, no. 3: (1998): 271–84,
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/The_Incentive_for_Non-Price_Discrimination.pdf.
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1.  CALIBRATION OF POTENTIAL WELFARE LOSSES
There are no published estimates of the elasticity of demand for 
various Internet applications.  Thus, it is very hard to estimate the 
exact effect of the proposed price discrimination scheme.  However, 
Goolsbee, using early data, estimates the elasticity of demand for 
broadband Internet access to be approximately ε = 3, at a price of $40 
with marginal cost at $25,40 i.e., at a 60% markup over cost.41  We may 
assume, that a new price discrimination scheme would precipitate a 
moderate increase in average price of at least 20%.  This would imply 
a deadweight loss (“DWL”) of at least 6% of the annual total Internet 
broadband access bill, using the standard approximate calculation 
DWL = (ΔP)(ΔQ)/2 = ε(QP)(ΔP/P)2/2, where ΔP/P is the proposed 
percentage price increase, here 20%, and ε is the elasticity of demand, 
here ε = 3.  OECD puts the number of broadband subscriptions in the 
United States at almost 60 million.42  This brings the annual revenue 
to networks from broadband access to $24 billion and the estimated 
direct welfare loss to residential consumers to roughly $144 million 
annually.  Currently, there is no good estimate of the additional 
welfare loss to business customers.
The above estimate is a moderate lower bound on the surplus 
losses that may be generated by price discrimination by the access 
networks.  In addition to the direct losses to consumers, the proposed 
price discrimination scheme will decrease consumer surplus in a 
variety of ways:
1. It will decrease consumers’ applications, and content 
providers’ surplus because it will imply a further divergence 
from efficient pricing in the presence of network effects;
2. It will foreclose on the margin potential entrants in 
complementary applications and content markets; 
40 Austan Goolsbee, “The Value of Broadband and the Deadweight Loss of Taxing New 
Technology,” Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy 5, no.1 (2006): 13, 
http://journals.ohiolink.edu/ejc/pdf.cgi/Goolsbee_Austan.pdf?issn=15380645&issue=v05
i0001&article=1505_tvobatdlotnt.
41 Here marginal cost does not mean the cost of a single transmission.  It rather means 
deployment of service to a customer. 
42 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Broadband Statistics 
to December 2006,” http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_
201185_38446855_1_1_1_1,00.htm.
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3. It will decrease innovative activity of applications and 
content providers at the edge of the network; and 
4. It will give the access providers the ability to choose which 
content and/or application will be successful removing the 
significant benefits of mix and match.
It is difficult to quantify the extent of these surplus losses.  Noting, 
however, that the current cost of residential access is less than $24 
billion, the profits of the complementary goods and services and 
applications plus consumers surplus from these are a large multiple of 
this amount.
2.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The question posed to Congress is whether it should intervene 
now by imposing non-discrimination restrictions or if it should wait 
for antitrust suits to be filed and resolved.  In my opinion, it is better 
to impose the non-discrimination restrictions by law because:
1. Suits take time and much damage can be done before they 
are resolved.  The legal system is slow and lawsuits will not 
be resolved in “Internet time.”
2. The abolition of “net neutrality” gives rise to a variety of anti-
trust concerns, while each suit would typically deal with one 
issue.  Thus, delays may be compounded by the need for each 
type of suit to be adjudicated.
3. The Internet is a key essential network for growth of the U.S. 
economy.  The United States is already lagging behind 14 
countries in Internet penetration, as seen in Figures 3 and 4 
below.  Figure 4 shows that a number of countries with 
higher broadband Internet penetration than the United 
States have lower population densities, so U.S. population 
density does not explain the low penetration.43  Since the 
Internet is a key factor for future growth, high penetration is 
desirable and adding price discrimination is unlikely to help.
43 Iceland, Finland, Norway, Canada and Sweden have lower population densities than the 
United States, but have significantly higher broadband Internet penetration.
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4. Increasing prices through two-sided pricing will not increase 
network traffic or contribute to network growth. 
5. The abolition of “net neutrality” is likely to have significant 
negative consequences on innovation on the Internet, 
whether or not anti-trust violations occur in connection with 
the abolition of “net neutrality”, and therefore it is in the 
public interest to prevent it by law.
Figure 3.  Broadband Internet Penetration and per Capita Income44
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44 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Broadband Statistics 
to December 2006,” http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_ 
201185_38446855_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed April 10, 2008).
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Figure 4.  Broadband Internet Penetration and Population Density45
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IV.  CONCLUSION
The Internet is the most important telecommunications network 
of the last fifty years.  Enabled by public protocols and standards, and 
by significant advances in electronics, computers, fiberoptics, and 
laser technology, the Internet has been an engine for the growth of 
both the United States and world economies.  Relying on public 
protocols, applications are developed to run across the Internet and 
content is disseminated on the Internet without the approval or 
consent of centralized Internet operators.  Tremendous successes 
resulted such as the World Wide Web and all the applications that run 
on it, including big financial successes like Yahoo and Google, as well 
as big benefits of social interaction networks and great leaps in civil 
society through new discussion forums and formats.
The Internet, in its commercial form, is a relatively new network, 
with only a dozen or so years to date.  Its tremendous acceptance and 
success has made it an essential part of both business and personal 
life.  All previous electronic networks, including early successes, like 
AOL, have abandoned proprietary formats and folded into the 
Internet.  The success of the Internet thus far has been based on 
openness and non-discrimination, which until recently, was 
45 Ibid.
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guaranteed by U.S. telecommunications regulation.  Recently, the 
abolition of this regulation has led to proposals by broadband Internet 
access providers that would radically change pricing on the Internet.  
This article shows that these changes are likely to hurt consumers and 
diminish innovative activities in complementary sectors such as 
computer applications and content dissemination.  These pricing 
proposals, if implemented, are likely to raise a variety of significant 
anti-competitive concerns, outlined in detail in the article.
Among these concerns is the possibility that access providers will 
degrade and/or restrict capacity in traditional Internet access to force 
applications and content providers to use their new “premium” 
service.  The possibility exists that this degradation and restriction of 
capacity will happen in a coordinated way, in a cartel-like fashion.  
This article demonstrates that, even in the absence of such 
discrimination, due to the existence of network effects, charging a fee 
to application and content providers is likely to both hurt consumers 
and to reduce the benefit that the Internet brings to society as a whole.
In addition, there are a large number of vertical anti-competitive 
concerns created by the absence of a non-discrimination policy.   
Access networks, if left unrestrained by non-discrimination rules, 
have incentives to favor their own services, applications, and content 
and to kill competing services, such as independent VOIP providers, 
which provide alternative telephone services over the Internet.  
Additionally, the access networks have incentives to leverage their 
access monopoly or duopoly market power in many other 
complementary markets by offering “take it or leave it” contracts.  
Thus, the access providers will be able to determine who will be the 
primary provider of search engines, content, and other applications 
and services.  This would be highly detrimental to the consumers and 
industries that rely on the Internet. 
The present question before Congress is whether to allow the 
Internet to be run without non-discrimination rules or whether to 
impose specific non-discrimination rules.  A number of considerations 
favor imposing a specific rule supporting “net neutrality.”  First, 
litigation is very slow, and much damage can be done before the 
resolution of litigation establishes a clear rule.  Second, there are a 
number of different antitrust concerns, and litigation will have to deal 
with each one at a time.  Third, although the Internet is a crucial 
network supporting United States’ economic growth, Internet 
penetration in the United States is low compared to many other 
countries with much lower per capita income.  The imposition of 
discrimination is likely to amplify these problems.  Fourth, because of 
network effects, the correct public policy is to subsidize the Internet, 
rather than increase its price.  The price discrimination schemes 
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discussed are likely to effectively increase the price consumers pay for 
Internet access.  Finally, the innovation “at the edge” of the network 
that has flourished under the regime of “net neutrality” would be 
significantly threatened by discriminatory actions.
